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The New Modes of EU Governance:
Combining Rationalism and Constructivism
in Explaining Voluntarist Policy
Coordination in the EU1
Die freiwillige Koordinierung nationaler Politikbereiche und der Vergleich von „Best Practice“ Model-
len durch die „Offene Methode der Koordinierung“ (OMK) haben in den letzten Jahren eine intensive
Debatte in der Politikwissenschaft ausgelöst. Kann die OMK innerstaatlichen Politikwandel fördern?
Wenn ja, unter welchen Bedingungen? Dieser Artikel analysiert diese Frage aus theoretischer Perspekti-
ve, in dem eine rationalistische und eine konstruktivistische Perspektive verglichen und kombiniert wer-
den. Aus rationalistischer Sicht werden konvergierende Akteurspräferenzen, der „Schatten der Hierar-
chie“, sowie „unterschiedliche Ermächtigung“ als zentrale Erklärungsfaktoren für paradigmatischen
Politikwandel identifiziert. Aus konstruktivistischer Sicht wird die Bedeutung von kommunikativen und
koordinativen Diskurs als Mechanismen der Überzeugung und der Wissensproduktion betont. Der Artikel
schlägt eine komplementäre Kombination dieser beiden gegensätzlichen, jedoch nicht inkompatiblen,
Ansätze vor und kommt, auf Basis der analysierten Faktoren, zu dem Schluss, dass die Wirkungseffizienz
der OMK in der Praxis gering sein wird.
Keywords. Rationalismus, Konstruktivismus, Spieltheorie, Akteurs-zentrierter Institutionalismus,
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1. Introduction
During recent years, the EU has developed
a stronger role in social and labour market poli-
cies through the use of voluntary forms of do-
mestic policy coordination between the EU
Member States (MS), in particular through the
introduction of the “European Employment
Strategy” (EES) in 1997 and the “Open Method
of Coordination” (OMC) in 2000. This devel-
opment has created a lively debate among po-
litical scientists, in particular those studying the
EU. The potential and the limits of the EES and
the OMC, and even their very nature, have re-
mained essentially contested among academic
scholars and political actors alike.
The consequences of European integration
for the sustainability and the development of
national welfare state institutions and the capac-
ity of the EU to contribute positively to their
sustenance are often assessed in a highly scep-
tical way in the academic literature. The Euro-
pean integration project has been identified by
Scharpf (1999) as systematically favoring
“negative integration” (market-making EU poli-
cies) over “positive integration” (market-cor-
148 Thomas Paster (Florenz)
recting EU policies). On this view, the single
market and the Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU) create an intense regulatory competition
between MS to attract mobile economic actors,
disabling MS to pursue market-correcting policy
objectives. At the same time, the development
of EU market-correcting policies is disabled by
the EU’s own decision-making procedures. Fur-
thermore, as pointed out by Streeck (1996)
societal interest groups, such as the social part-
ners, face enormous collective action problems
at the EU level, leading to so-called “Neo-
Voluntarism”, i.e. a laissez-faire-style, inefficient
way of conflict resolution, reflected, for in-
stance, in a strong tendency towards lowest com-
mon denominator solutions in EU employment
regulation.
It is in the context of these problematique
that the development of the OMC as a new mode
of governance in the area of EU labour market
and social policies had attained interest among
academics and political actors. The OMC has,
initially, been considered as a potentially effec-
tive tool for overcoming the impasse in moving
towards positive integration (Scharpf 2003) and
as an innovative way of policy-making, enabling
a more participatory and deliberative style of
policy-making (Eberlein/Kerwer 2004; Regent
2003).
The purpose of this article is to analyze the
potential consequences of the OMC for domes-
tic policy-making from a theoretical perspec-
tive. Due to its very recent nature, empirical
knowledge about the working of the OMC and
of its impact on domestic policy-making is still
very limited. In addition, attempts to produce
empirical evidence of its impact or lack thereof
faces methodological challenges in singling out
the role of the OMC from the many factors in-
fluencing domestic policy-making. This article
will, therefore, focus on a theoretical analysis
of the effectiveness of the coordination mecha-
nisms applied by the OMC. In any case, such
theoretical understandings guide the focus of
empirical research and therefore need detailed
consideration.
In this article we look on the OMC from two
antithetical, but not entirely incompatible, theo-
retical perspectives: a rationalist view and a
constructivist view. Can these two approaches
provide suitable theoretical frameworks for
analyzing the effects of the OMC on domestic
labour market policy-making? I will argue that,
if the two approaches are applied in a comple-
mentary way, they provide us with a more real-
istic understanding of the actual working mecha-
nisms of the OMC. The article is structured in
the following way: After giving a brief over-
view about the OMC, the two approaches are
analyzed. First, the main theoretical propositions
of each approach are briefly summarized. Then,
their applicability to the OMC is analyzed, point-
ing out the potential as well as the limits of both
approaches. The final section outlines how the
two approaches can be combined in a comple-
mentary way to result in a more complete un-
derstanding of the OMC. The article concludes
that, using these theoretical insights, the OMC
can be expected to contribute little to real policy
improvements unless some benevolent condi-
tions are given.
2. Policy Coordination and Soft
Governance in the EU
The development of social and labour mar-
ket policies at the EU level has lagged behind
the pace of economic integration since the out-
set of the integration process in the 1950s. Di-
verging MS preferences, the substantive differ-
ences in welfare state and labour market insti-
tutions and the differing normative aspirations
they are linked with, have effectively blocked
any attempts at EU level harmonization in this
policy fields in the past and will most likely do
so in the foreseeable future. As a consequence,
the effectiveness of the traditional “Community
method”, i.e. the joint agreement of binding EU
legislation between the Commission, the MS and
the European Parliament, is necessarily highly
constrained in this area. Given this blockage to
create “hard law”, the EU has seen a trend to-
wards “softer” forms of governance, which fo-
cus on using less binding, more voluntarist and
flexible forms of policy-making. The introduc-
tion of the EES and the OMC are the most sig-
nificant events in this regard.2
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The EES was initiated at the European Coun-
cil summit in Essen in 1994 and was subse-
quently included in the form of a so-called “Em-
ployment Title” in the Amsterdam Treaty
(Griller et al. 2000). The strategy essentially
consists of the coordination of national employ-
ment policies through the exchange of informa-
tion on employment policy between the MS, in
particular through the use of multilateral moni-
toring mechanisms for national policy decisions.
MS should learn from each other’s experiences
and exchange knowledge on “best practice”
policies by engaging in an iterative peer-review
process, comparing national policies with the
use of policy benchmarks and indicators. Cru-
cially, the EES does not include the possibility
to sanction a non-complying MS. It is thus de-
pendent on the voluntary participation by the
national governments.
The coordination process is organized in the
form of an annual coordination cycle. Its key
stages are the following: First, the Social Af-
fairs Council, acting upon a proposal from the
Commission, agrees upon the objectives and
principles that MS should take into account
when planning their employment policy, called
the “European Employment Guidelines” (EEG).
Second, the MS draw up “National Action
Plans” (NAPs), which include the measures they
plan to take to implement the guidelines. Third,
the Commission and the Council evaluate the
individual NAPs in a peer-review process.
Fourth, the Commission can, based on the peer-
review, propose “recommendations” towards
individual MSs, which have then to be agreed
upon by the Council. Finally, the Commission
and the Council produce a joint report to be dis-
cussed by the Heads of State and Government
in the European Council.
At the Lisbon European Council in the year
2000 the scope of policy coordination was ex-
panded to a number of new policy areas, in-
cluding pension reform, social inclusion, edu-
cation, migration and innovation policy
(Borrás/Greve 2004). At the same time the vari-
ous coordination procedures were labeled with
a new name: “The Open Method of Coordina-
tion”. All the coordination procedures share in
common a focus on voluntarist policy-making,
intended to facilitate policy learning across the
MS, by using peer-reviews, multilateral moni-
toring, benchmarking and policy indicators.
However, the effectiveness of these procedures
remains contested. Does the OMC actually de-
liver on its promise of facilitating cross-national
policy learning and leading to a more par-
ticipatory, as well as deliberative, way of deci-
sion-making? Due to its only recent appear-
ance, empirical knowledge about the OMC is
still rather limited. The preliminary evidence
that is available is neither conclusive nor defi-
nite.
Two major empirical studies of the OMC
have so far been undertaken: the Cologne-based
“GoveCor” project and the EU Commission’s
Five-Year Evaluation of the EES in 2002 (Eu-
ropean Commission 2002). These studies con-
firm that any direct effect of the OMC on do-
mestic policy change is difficult to identify, as
this influence is a very indirect one. The involve-
ment of private actors, the social partners in
particular, seems to have been very weak in
many MS (Goetschy 2003, 81f.). It is the na-
tional governments and the Commission that
largely control the process. Given the difficul-
ties in measuring the policy learning effects of
the OMC, it is even more important to improve
the theoretical understanding of the conditions
under which multilateral policy learning through
the OMC may take place. I will in this article
analyze these potential effects by discussing two
antithetical theoretical approaches, which rely
on the importance of rational self-interests and
ideas respectively.
3. Rationalist and Constructivist
Frameworks
Analyzing how the EES and the OMC work
and in what ways they “europeanise” national
processes of policy decision-making and related
policy outputs requires a general explanatory
framework of how the coordination procedure
works. Much of the work on the Euro-
peanization of national policies, politics and
polities (see for instance Risse et al. 2001;
Börzel/Risse 2000; Dyson 2000; Liebert 2002)
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is informed by an analytical differentiation be-
tween rationalist and constructivist perspectives
on the mechanisms of Europeanization.
The contestation between rationalism and
constructivism emerged first in the International
Relations discipline in the mid 1980s, when a
number of scholars began to question the epis-
temological and ontological assumptions of the
dominant rationalist paradigm, which informed
both realist and liberal theories. Most essential
to the development of the constructivist posi-
tion was probably the meta-theoretical work of
Kratochwil and Ruggie (Kratochwil 1989;
Kratochwil/Ruggie 1986). An other essential
proponent is Wendt (Wendt 1998; 1999), who
developed a more moderate or “thin” variant of
constructivism.
Constructivism and rationalism are based on
fundamentally different philosophical positions
about what the social reality is made up of (on-
tology) and how we, as social scientists, can
know something about it (epistemology). The
intention of this article, however, is not to dis-
cuss these philosophical questions of epistemol-
ogy and ontology, but to apply the two ap-
proaches to our substantive research topic. Nev-
ertheless, it is essential to explicate briefly the
most important epistemological and ontologi-
cal positions, which the two approaches are
based upon.
Rationalist perspectives start from the as-
sumption that political actors are motivated by
egoistic self-interest. Rationalist approaches,
however, do not try to explain these interests
and preferences, but, instead, rely on some gen-
eral assumptions about them. In other words,
interests and preferences are taken as exo-
genously given and are assumed to remain sta-
ble over time. In particular, the rationalist para-
digm assumes that instrumental rationality is a
core motivation of human action3 . Because of
this, means-ends calculations are essential to
explain political behavior. Political actors pur-
sue strategies (means) that are suited best to meet
their preferences (ends). Political behavior is,
thus, driven by what March and Olsen call a
logic of consequentialism (March/Olsen 1989).
This position relies fundamentally on methodo-
logical individualism, which assumes that, in
principle, social phenomena can be explained
in terms of individuals, their interests and ac-
tions4 . With the exception of the most radical
variants of rational choice theory, institutions
do, however, play a role as well, because they
provide an opportunity structure for political
actors, thus enabling and constraining the stra-
tegic choices available to them.
Constructivism5  challenges the rationalist
assumptions. Its ontological position states the
social constructedness of reality. From this view,
preferences and interests are not given, but are
beliefs that reflect an individual’s identity. What
is important, therefore, is to understand how
interests and ideas develop in a process of so-
cial construction. Constructivists, consequently,
focus on the importance of ideas, norms and
values in explaining the processes and the re-
sults of policy-making. Processes of socia-
lization, identity formation and norm internali-
zation are at the center of their explanatory
framework. This position, questioning methodo-
logical individualism, is based on the ontologi-
cal assumption that structure and agent consti-
tute each other and should therefore be seen as
a whole (Adler 2002, 104ff.).
Although constructivism and rationalism are
fundamentally different positions, they are not
contradictory, at least if they are not understood
as dogmatic positions. Although, in the past, the
debate between constructivists and rationalists
has often been confrontational and heated, the
view that the two paradigms should be under-
stood in a complementary way has gained
ground in recent years. In a seminal article,
Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner argued that
“rationalism and constructivism are generic
theoretical orientations that are complementary
on some crucial points” (Katzenstein et al. 1998,
680). Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel take the
same position when they argue, “that the
metatheoretical debate about institutions has run
its course and must now give way to theoreti-
cal, methodological, and carefully structured
dialogue” (Jupille et al. 2003, 8). This is also
the position taken in this article. One way of
achieving such a dialogue, which Jupille and
his colleagues propose, is to take a so-called
domain of application approach by trying to
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identify the scope conditions under which each
perspective can be applied (Jupille et al. 2003,
21f).
The article aspires to follow this strategy and
will compare two specific theories, each repre-
senting one of the perspectives: the framework
of actor-centered institutionalism, developed by
Fritz W. Scharpf, taken as a representation of a
rationalist perspective on policy-making, and
discursive institutionalism developed by Vivien
A. Schmidt, taken as representing a construc-
tivist view. Both approaches will be discussed
regarding their ability to explain the processes
and results of policy coordination through the
EES and the OMC. How can we use these two
frameworks to capture the impact of the EES
and the OMC on domestic policy change? The
article analyses the explanatory potential, as well
as the shortcomings, of the two approaches and
thereby tries to make two points: First, that a
complementary use addresses the weaknesses
of the respective other approach, and second,
that paradigmatic policy change through the
OMC is only likely to happen under specific
favorable conditions
4. Actor-centered institutionalism and
Game Theory
Actor-centered institutionalism is inspired by
the intention to overcome the dualism between
the actor level and the institutional level (Scharpf
1997, 36), which is reflected in most political
science theories.6  The approach intends to pro-
vide a framework to analyze policy processes
driven by the interaction of political actors in a
given institutional setting. (Scharpf 1997, 37).
This section will briefly outline the main
concepts of this approach, which was originally
developed by Mayntz and Scharpf (Mayntz/
Scharpf 1995) and later augmented by Scharpf
with game theoretical models (Scharpf 1997).
The starting point for explaining policy-mak-
ing processes and their outcomes is to identify
the actors, individual or collective, that are in-
volved in the policy-making process. Actors are
characterized by specific action capabilities,
preferences and perceptions. The resources
available to them characterize their action ca-
pabilities: financial and human resources,
knowledge, competences and the rights they
possess. In policy-making systems most action
capabilities are constituted by institutional rules,
i.e. the tasks, competences and participation
rights ascribed to actors, including the veto po-
sitions they have. The action orientations of
political actors are constituted by their prefer-
ences and their perceptions of the policy issues
and problems and the causal mechanisms un-
derlying them.
The behavior of political actors does, how-
ever, depend not only on their own preferences,
perceptions and action capabilities, but, cru-
cially, also on the actor constellation. This de-
scribes the actors involved, their action
orientations, the possible outcomes associated
with specific strategy combinations and actors’
valuations of these outcomes, i.e. their outcome
preferences.
The central ambition of Scharpf is to con-
ceptualize these actor constellations by game
theoretical tools. Each game-theoretical model
represents a specific “logic of the situation”
determined by a specific actor constellation
(Scharpf 1997, 72ff.).
A specific actor constellation, then, com-
bined with a specific mode of interaction deter-
mines the outcome of the policy-making proc-
ess. Scharpf distinguishes four such modes:
unilateral action (“non-cooperation”), negoti-
ated agreement, majority voting and hierarchi-
cal action. The institutional setting, consisting
of formal and informal rules, determines the
mode of interaction that is most likely to emerge.
This is because the institutional rules enable and
constrain actors, i.e. they form the actors’ op-
portunity structure. Examples of institutional
settings given by Scharpf are “anarchic fields”,
“networks”, “associations” and “hierarchical
organizations”. Each of these settings is char-
acterized by specific institutional rules, which
do or do not allow for specific modes of inter-
action. Thus, unilateral action can occur in set-
tings with only minimum institutional rules,
while decisions by majority vote or by hierar-
chical authority require a more demanding in-
stitutional setting.
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4.1. Actor-Centered Institutionalism, Game
 Theory and the European Employment
Strategy
Understood in game theoretical terms, the
EES can be analyzed as a game played by na-
tional governments, which also involves other
domestic actors and is orchestrated by the Com-
mission. According to this perspective, its prob-
lem-solving capacity can be judged by analyzing
the institutional setting, the modes of interac-
tion it allows and the actor constellations in-
volved. In this section, three conditions under
which such a game can be expected to lead to
policy change and policy learning, understood
here as “learning from others”, will be presented.
Applying his four modes of interaction to
the multilevel system of decision-making in the
EU, Scharpf (2001a) distinguishes between four
idealtypical modes of European policy-making:
(i) mutual adjustment of MS policies as a result
of economic regime competition (a non-coop-
erative game), (ii) intergovernmental negotia-
tion, based on the need for a unanimous con-
sensus among the MS, (iii) hierarchical direc-
tion through unilateral decision by the EU, with-
out MS involvement, and (iv) joint-decision-
making by supranational and intergovernmen-
tal actors (Scharpf 2001b).
Scharpf’s analysis of the problem-solving
capacity of the four modes of interactions re-
flects the basic assumptions of actor-centered
institutionalism: the outputs (problem-solving
capacity) of policy-making processes (modes of
interaction) are equally shaped by the rules of
decision-making (the institutional setting) and
the constellation of actor preferences. For in-
stance, the problem-solving capacity of inter-
governmental negotiations and joint-decision
systems both depend on a high level of prefer-
ence convergence among the actors involved,
while hierarchical direction offers stronger prob-
lem-solving capacity but puts extremely high
demands on the institutional setting.
Applying his typology to the OMC, Scharpf
suggests that it consists of a combination of
mutual adjustment and intergovernmental ne-
gotiations (Scharpf 2001a). The procedures of
establishing common policy guidelines and the
monitoring, benchmarking and peer-reviewing
of national policy choices may be described as
intergovernmental in nature, as long as no strong
role for the Commission is assumed. The fact
that OMC does not involve any bargaining to-
wards binding agreements and the fact that po-
litical responsibility for the policy choices re-
mains ultimately with national parliaments thus
make OMC look more similar to the mode of
mutual adjustment.
4.1.1. A rationalist explanation of the OMC
A rationalist explanation of the OMC builds
on three conditions for effective policy coordi-
nation: preference convergence, the shadow of
hierarchy and differential empowerment.
Firstly, the problem-solving capacity of the
EES primarily depends on the occurrence of
preference convergence. This means, that the
impact of the EES on national policy choices
will primarily depend on whether policy pref-
erences of national governments are in line with
the preferences enshrined in the EES policy
paradigms or not: “the expected benefits of
OMC depend crucially on the willingness of
those national actors who are in fact in control
of policy choices to get themselves involved in
European coordination” (Scharpf 2002, 654).
This, again, depends on the extend to which
these actors are committed to the policy para-
digm pushed by the OMC. This means, that,
from a rationalist perspective, one will expect
the OMC to lead to only moderate – techno-
cratic – forms of policy change, because a ra-
tionalist perspective assumes that preferences
result from material self-interest and are in prin-
ciple stable. Such weak forms of policy learn-
ing involve the improvement of policy instru-
ments, where they are considered as being inef-
ficient. This applies, for instance, to improve-
ments in training programs for unemployed per-
sons. Fundamental policy changes will not re-
sult from voluntary modes of policy coordina-
tion.
Secondly, a more fundamental change, a
paradigm shift, can only be expected as a result
of changes in the external incentive structure,
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which results in a changed pay-off structure for
specific actors strategies. An actor, thus, might
change the strategy if a new incentive makes
the existing strategy less efficient. Scharpf has
pointed out that the thread of unilateral action,
the so-called shadow of hierarchy, can be an
important incentive. He has shown, how tripar-
tite policy concertation between the government,
employers and unions is facilitated by the thread
of unilateral governmental action, thereby co-
ercing the social partners into co-operation
(Scharpf 1997, 197ff.). Most OMC processes,
however, do not provide the possibility of uni-
lateral action by the EU. The possibility of fi-
nancial sanctions, a potentially important mate-
rial incentive, is included in the fiscal policy
coordination procedure (Stability and Growth
Pact), but not in the other OMC processes (em-
ployment, social inclusion, pension reform, etc).
As a result, paradigmatic policy change may
occur even in the absence of preference con-
vergence, if the shadow of hierarchy is strong
enough.
Thirdly, the OMC can lead to a differential
empowerment of the political actors, involving
in particular the members of national govern-
ments and the social partners. The EES, express-
ing a specific paradigm of supply-side employ-
ment policies, may thus enhance the action re-
sources of national governments advocating
supply-side reforms vis-à-vis those societal ac-
tors that are opposed to these reforms. Thus,
taking governmental preference convergence for
granted, the OMC may provide additional ac-
tion resources to the government by increasing
the political legitimacy of potentially unpopu-
lar reforms and also by partially shifting politi-
cal responsibility for unemployment problems
to the European level (see Schäfer 2002, 25ff.).
As a consequence, political pressure on govern-
ments, coming from sceptical domestic actors,
may be weakened. However, as the OMC is
purely voluntaristic and does not provide mate-
rial incentives for policy change, the differen-
tial empowerment effect should be expected to
be to weak to overcome strong domestic veto
player positions (Tsebelis 1990).
To conclude, a rationalist approach does lo-
cate the conditions for the effectiveness of vol-
untary policy coordination through the OMC
primarily in the intensity of preference con-
vergence among MS, in the intensity of the
shadow of hierarchy and in the incidence of
differential empowerment favoring pro-reform
actors. If commitment among national govern-
ments towards a specific common objective is
strong and veto player positions are missing
or can be overcome, policy learning by means
of monitoring, peer-reviewing and information
exchange can lead to instrumental forms of
policy learning. On the other hand, if these
benevolent conditions are missing, EES should
be expected to remain an empty procedure, as
effective policy coordination is not possible
without cooperation of domestic policy-mak-
ers.
4.1.2. Shortcomings of the rationalist
explanation model
While the rationalist explanation model of
the OMC can explain instrumental policy
changes concerning the effectiveness of exist-
ing policy instruments, it has difficulties in ex-
plaining paradigmatic policy changes, i.e.
changes in the fundamental ideas and objectives
of policy makers, because such changes are dif-
ficult to understand as the direct result of the
material self-interests of the political actors.
This weakness is due to the lack of attention
given to two factors: the role of common knowl-
edge and that of persuasion (Katzenstein et al.
1998). Firstly, the formation of policy prefer-
ences is based on the actors’ shared knowledge
about the problems and possible solutions in a
policy area. As this knowledge can change, so,
too, can the preferences. Secondly, the impact
of persuasion on the actors’ preferences and
beliefs is not generally taken into account by
rationalist theory. These two points, I believe,
are important deficiencies of the rationalist ap-
proach, which can be dealt with by using ex-
planatory mechanisms that have emerged from
discourse theory. The next section thus looks at
how the OMC mechanisms can be explained
from the perspective of discursive institu-
tionalism.
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5.  Discursive Institutionalism
The framework of “discursive institu-
tionalism”7  was first developed by Vivien A.
Schmidt and has subsequently been elaborated
in several papers (Schmidt 2002a; 2002b; 2003;
2000). Her approach focuses on the power of
discourse to influence ideas, norms and values,
in order to explain the processes and results of
policy decision-making. Discourse is, thus, con-
ceptualized as an independent variable, which
can have real effects on policy-making, and not
just as a mere reflection of existing perceptions,
preferences, values and ideas (Schmidt 2003,
3). The explanatory role of discursive insti-
tutionalism, therefore, starts where rationalist
explanations fail, in cases where preferences are
volatile; strategies are not based upon narrow
self-interest or where actor information is im-
perfect.
Schmidt defines policy discourse as consist-
ing of “whatever policy actors say to one an-
other and to the public in their efforts to gener-
ate and legitimize a policy program. As such,
discourse encompasses both a set of policy ideas
and values and an interactive process of policy
construction and communication” (Schmidt
2002a, 210). In other words, the concept of dis-
course involves two dimensions: an interactive-
procedural dimension (who speaks to whom)
and an ideational dimension (what is said).
The ideational dimension of policy discourse
serves to create new policy ideas, paradigms and
programs, legitimizing existing ones as well as
challenging them. In order for discourse to be
successful in generating and legitimizing poli-
cies, it has to fulfill both cognitive and norma-
tive functions. The normative function of dis-
course is to legitimate the political goals of a
policy program by appealing to long-standing
or newly emerging values, ideas and norms
(what should be achieved?). Normative dis-
course, thus, communicates the moral and idea-
tional appropriateness of the policy program to
the public or to other actors, and shows that the
policy reflects the values and ideas of the con-
stituency. The cognitive function serves to offer
solutions to problems and to define efficient
policy instruments (what should be done to
achieve an objective?). It demonstrates re-
levance, applicability, coherence and greater
problem-solving capacity of a policy program.
In short, normative discourse is aimed at show-
ing that the policy is right, cognitive discourse
that it is actually working (Schmidt 2002a, 213-
230) .
While the ideational dimension represents
what is said, the interactive dimension deals with
who talks to whom and for which purpose.
Policy discourse follows two interactive func-
tions: a coordinative and a communicative func-
tion. As part of its coordinative function it serves
political actors to deliberate differing policies
options among them, to construct a policy pro-
gram and to come to an agreement on it (Schmidt
2003).
The communicative function of discourse is
to communicate the policy program agreed upon
at the coordinative stage to the general public,
to the voter constituencies and to the groups
specifically affected by it. The political actors
translate the policy program into accessible lan-
guage for public discussion and deliberation, in
order to convince the public about the norma-
tive legitimacy and cognitive adequacy of the
policy program, but also to challenge the legiti-
macy and the adequacy of competing programs
and to generate new policy ideas. As the dis-
courses of different political actors differ in their
effectiveness to convince the public, discourse
is a real causal factor in explaining the success
or failure of policy change (Schmidt 2002a, 230-
239). Based on her own research on political-
economic reforms in different countries,
Schmidt argues that the long-term viability of
far-reaching reforms can only be achieved if
policy decision-makers succeed in convincing
the public about the normative legitimacy of
their reforms (Schmidt 2002b, 257ff.).
Discursive institutionalism links the relative
importance of the coordinative and the commu-
nicative discourses to the institutional constel-
lation. In so-called multi-actor systems strong
coordinative discourses combine with weak
communicative discourses, while in so-called
single-actor systems weak coordinative dis-
courses combine with strong communicative
discourses. This results from the differences in
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the institutional rules of policy-making and con-
comitant differences in the strategies of policy
legitimacy.
5.1. Discourse in single-actor constellations
In systems with single-actor systems, the
coordinative discourse tends to be thin and the
communicative discourse tends to be elaborate.
Single-actor systems are, for instance, unitary
nation states with majoritarian election systems,
where power is concentrated in the national ex-
ecutive. In such states, policy-making tends to
be government-centered, only involving a
highly restricted number of high-ranking offi-
cials. Regional and local governments, the so-
cial partners, opposition parties, or other private
actors are not involved in the policy decision-
making process. Consequently, the coordinative
discourse does not need to accommodate a large
variety of conflicting interests and the national
executive tends to have greater discretion in
policy choice as in multi-actor systems. For the
same reason, the communicative discourse tends
to be strong, because this is the only way gov-
ernments can gain societal acceptance for their
policies. Consequently, communicative dis-
course has a very important role to play in sin-
gle-actor states’ policy-making.
5.2. Discourse in multi-actor constellations
Systems with a so-called multi-actor system
are characterized by joint-decision systems,
where a wider range of political actors includ-
ing, for instance, regional and local governments
and organized societal interests, are involved in
negotiations about policy programs. In such
systems, national governments tend to have lit-
tle authority to impose decisions unilaterally.
Consequently, the coordinative discourse tends
to be elaborate, because there is a need for the
political actors to reconcile their differing posi-
tions, while the government’s communicative
discourse tends to be comparatively thin, be-
cause the societal interest groups involved in
the bargaining process take the responsibility
to convince their respective constituencies of the
necessity and legitimacy of the agreements
made. Communication with the general public,
however, tends to be thin, as the involvement
of a variety of private and public actors with
conflicting positions makes the generation of a
strong governmental-national discourse, con-
temporaneously coherent and convincing to all
affected groups, very difficult (Schmidt 2002a,
244).
5.3. Discursive Institutionalism and the OMC
What can discursive institutionalism tell us
about the problem-solving effectiveness of the
OMC? What are the potentials and limits of
policy learning through the OMC? The essence
of discursive institutionalism, as outlined above,
is that the quality and intensity of discourse
matters for the success or failure of policy re-
forms. In the long run, substantial policy reforms
can only be successful if they are accompanied
by an intense discourse, which has to be con-
vincing not only in its cognitive content, but also
in its normative legitimacy. According to this
approach, there are basically two ways for how
the OMC can contribute towards these goals:
by coordinative and by communicative mecha-
nisms.
The policy coordination mechanism of the
OMC resembles a multi-actor and multi-level
system. We, therefore, have to expect it to rely
on the power of coordinative, rather than com-
municative, discourse mechanisms. The OMC
involves a large number of private and public
actors from the domestic and the supra-national
level in a policy coordination circle that is or-
ganized in a non-hierarchical way, with actual
decision-making power being dispersed among
them and without the possibility of centralized
hierarchical action by the EU. The advocates of
the OMC point precisely to its non-hierarchical
nature and its innovative and experimental char-
acter as being the OMC’s key strength, leading
to more participative and deliberative policy-
making (Eberlein/Kerwer 2004; Mosher/Trubek
2003; Regent 2003).
The EES and the OMC are based on the
voluntary coordination of domestic policies. MS
agree on common policy objectives (guidelines)
and policy indicators and then evaluate and peer-
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review national policy programs and policy
outcomes in expert committees. The coordina-
tion process does not include any binding agree-
ments or “hard” sanctions, such as financial
fines. Instead, it relies on “learning mechanisms”
to facilitate policy change (Sabel 1994), under-
stood as the diffusion of a new policy paradigm
across countries. This form of “learning from
others” is expected to happen through multilat-
eral policy monitoring, benchmarking and peer-
reviewing of policy programs and policy per-
formances, but also through so-called “naming
and shaming”, meaning the exposure of non-
compliant states to public criticism.
5.3.1. A Constructivist explanation of the
OMC
Using discursive institutionalism, we can
analyze the causal mechanisms of EES/OMC
by applying the analytical distinction between
coordinative discourse and communicative dis-
course: The coordinative mechanisms are in-
tended to facilitate the diffusion of perceived
“good practices” across countries, leading in the
long run to policy learning, i.e. the diffusion of
new policy paradigms. These coordinative
mechanisms occur in EU policy committees (the
“Employment Committee” in the case of EES)
consisting of national civil servants and officials
from the Commission. They are conducted be-
hind closed doors, and discourse takes the form
of deliberation and arguing, rather than bargain-
ing or negotiating. Mechanisms of coordinative
discourse are to be found in all forms of peer-
reviewing, mutual monitoring, benchmarking
and the like. The effectiveness of this mecha-
nism has to be based on the capacity of expert
discourse to change the cognitive and norma-
tive beliefs and preferences of political actors.
OMC coordinative discourses will tend to fo-
cus on aspects of cognitive necessity, rather than
normative legitimacy. In other words, actors will
be keen to learn which policies work best, not
which objectives are most desirable.
The communicative mechanisms of the EES
and the OMC concern how the actors involved
communicate the policy paradigms and the re-
sults of policy coordination to the public. Se-
lecting good or bad cases for public exposure
(“naming and shaming”), can be expected to
have a significant impact on domestic policy
issues. It may generate a public discourse about
the reasons for lagging behind and may put pres-
sure on domestic decision-makers to commit
themselves more to the suggested policy objec-
tives. On the other hand, national executives can
make use of a good ranking position to
strengthen their own political standing in rela-
tion to other domestic actors. At the EU level,
the communicative function falls primarily to
the Commission, which together with the Coun-
cil presidency has the task of communicating
the normative legitimacy and cognitive neces-
sity of the policies suggested by the EES, in-
cluding the communication of common policy
guidelines, the results of peer-review proce-
dures, as well as the issuing of policy recom-
mendations directed towards individual MS.
Two crucial factors for the effectiveness of
the communicative mechanisms are first,
whether an intense public discourse around the
OMC policy paradigms and national policy per-
formances can be generated. Secondly, whether
this discourse is capable of showing the cogni-
tive necessity as well as the normative legiti-
macy of the suggested policies.
The OMC mechanisms provide highly
favorable conditions for such a discourse. Co-
ordinative discourses in OMC expert commit-
tees provide an ideal opportunity for the delib-
eration of the strengths and the shortcomings of
different national approaches to employment
policy and can thereby encourage policy learn-
ing among the national governments. Moreover,
it can also frame actors’ understanding of what
the substantive problems and desirable solutions
to them are. Thereby it may strengthen the new
supply-side economic policy paradigm, which
focuses on market de-regulation. Only if politi-
cal actors are willing to engage in an intense
coordinative discourse and in public debate
about it, a real impact of the OMC on policy
change is possible.
However, there may be a certain trade-off
between the intensity of communicative and
coordinative discourse. A strong coordinative
discourse on normatively salient and controver-
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sial policy issues, requiring substantial delib-
eration on these issues, may be disturbed by an
adversarial public debate probably involving the
very same actors. This can be the case, for in-
stance, regarding conflicts between labour un-
ions, employers and governments about labour-
market de-regulation. In a similar way, coun-
tries chosen for public “shaming” may not be
willing to substantially commit themselves to
transnational policy coordination.
5.3.2. Shortcomings of the constructivist
explanation model
Discursive institutionalism is interested in
the role of discourse in changing actors’ prefer-
ences and normative and cognitive beliefs. It
thereby opens what rationalist accounts deal
with as a black box: How and why do norma-
tive and cognitive beliefs – or in rationalist lan-
guage, their information and preferences – come
into being and change over time? An approach
solely centered on discourse cannot, however,
fully explain why certain ideas and paradigms
gain predominance in the policy discourse,
while others disappear. The reason for this is
that, for discourse to have an impact, self-inter-
ested, strategic political actors have to conduct
this discourse with the intention to either per-
suade other actors or, if they cannot succeed in
doing so, to at least discredit their positions by
making them seem normatively and cognitively
unacceptable to the wider public. Thereby, dis-
cursive capacities can be an important power
resource for purposeful, self-interested actors.8
This capacity depends as well on material
factors, such as financial means to conduct an
effective political campaign, as on immaterial
factors, such as the availability of favorable
expert advice or scientific evidence. To illus-
trate this point, the discourse about the need for
political-economic reforms to maintain interna-
tional competitiveness, conducted through the
OMC’s “Lisbon Strategy”, is arguably related
to the preferences of transnational, export-ori-
ented firms. As these firms are, however, in gen-
eral not directly involved in the political deci-
sion-making processes, they have to conduct a
convincing public discourse in order to persuade
political actors to change their preferences and
policy beliefs.
The power of discourse to change policy
beliefs is, however, not only dependent on the
discursive capacities of the political actors, but,
more fundamentally, on the nature of the policy
beliefs as such. Arguably, beliefs that are
normatively deeply rooted or firmly based on
fundamental material self-interest, will be much
more unlikely to change through any actor’s
discourse, than beliefs of a more instrumental
character. Consequently, discursive mechanisms
within the OMC, to the extend that they are ac-
tually taking place, are more likely to have an
impact on instrumental policy beliefs rather than
on strongly-held normative beliefs or on pref-
erences firmly based on material self-interest.
6. Combining Rationalism and
Constructivism
This article provided a theoretical analysis
of the potential effects of the policy coordina-
tion mechanisms of the OMC by comparing two
theories that reflect two different logics of ex-
planation. The main characteristics of both ap-
proaches and the hypotheses that have been
derived from them are summarized in Table 1.
So far, the analysis proceeded in an additive way,
showing how each approach can – independ-
ently – be applied to analyze important dimen-
sions of the coordination process and its out-
come. However, the article also identified im-
portant deficiencies in both approaches. These
deficiencies, I believe, are best addressed by
combining the two approaches in a complemen-
tary way. Complementarity implies that the ap-
proaches are applied in an additive way to com-
plementary “domains” or “scopes” of applica-
tion. The crucial task in combining theories,
consequently, is the identification of the “scope
conditions”  under which each approach can be
applied9 . In this final section the article presents
knowledge uncertainty as the key scope condi-
tion, which allows us to distinguish between two
types of policy change, paradigmatic
(constructivist) and non-paradigmatic (ration-
alist) change.
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As we have seen, rationalist approaches are
best suited to explain limited, instrumental forms
of policy adjustments, while the constructivist
framework better explains policy changes of a
more fundamental (paradigmatic) nature. Lim-
ited, instrumental forms of OMC-induced policy
change do not affect the fundamental policy
paradigms and policy ideas, and are, hence,
called non-paradigmatic policy change. Such
changes allow policy-makers to achieve their
preferred outcomes more effectively by mak-
ing existing policy instruments more effective,
while remaining firmly in line with the given
preferences and policy ideas. Applied to the
OMC, we can expect this type of change to be
facilitated by the exchange of information in
peer-reviews and policy expert committees.
OMC-induced non-paradigmatic change is,
however, only likely to occur when the prefer-
ences of the actors involved in the coordination
mechanism converge, as with normatively un-
controversial issues, like, for instance, active
labour market policy. It is unlikely to occur for
policy proposals that are normatively controver-
sial among the coordinating actors (preference
divergence).
Our constructivist framework, i.e. discursive
institutionalism, better explains paradigmatic
policy changes. Such changes involve a funda-
mental reorientation not only of the policy pref-
erences, but also the normative and cognitive
policy ideas that underlie these preferences. This
type of policy change, which is in general much
more unlikely and, in any case, slower than the
former, is, therefore, better explained by the
ideational impact of communicative and/or co-
ordinative discourse. Discursive institutionalism
is most valuable for the analysis of the OMC
where it requires a fundamental reorientation of
national policy paradigms, like, for instance, a
shift from employment protection to a de-regu-




Types of institutional Anarchy, joint-decision systems, (i) National single-actor or (ii)
settings associations, hierarchical national multi-actor or (iii) EU
organisations multi-level/multi-actor system
Function of the institutional Enables and constrains actors’ Shapes the location and function
setting strategy options (opportunity of discourse within the policy-
structure) making system
Main mode of political Bargaining Persuasion and deliberation
interaction (Strategic interactions) (Discursive interactions)
Idealtypical interactions Autonomous action, negotiation, Communicative or coordinative
majority voting, hierarchical discourse
direction
Main purpose of political Realising outcome preferences Creating and legitimising policy
interactions (maximization of given utility ideas, incl. their normative
function) legitimacy and cognitive
necessity. (result in belief change)
HYPOTHESES
Conditions favourable for (i) Preference convergence Intense (i) coordinative and (ii)
effective policy coordination (ii) Differential empowerment communicative discourses
(iii) “Shadow of hierarchy” facilitate persuasion (preference
change) and diminish knowledge
uncertainty.
Expected outcome Non-paradigmatic policy change Paradigmatic policy change
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instrumental adjustments. The scarce empirical
research about the domestic impact that the
OMC had so far, has shown that its coordina-
tive discourse had some ideational impact al-
though only on a very small group of actors,
mainly government officials (Jacobsson 2004,
366), and that it does not figure prominently in
national public discourses (Rhodes 2005, 508f.).
Here, rationalist factors, in particular the lack
of preference convergence on many normatively
salient issues and the absence of a “shadow of
hierarchy”, need to be applied to explain why
the OMC did so far not allow a stronger usage
of discursive strategies.
The combination of rationalist and construc-
tivist approaches shows that the OMC has only
limited potential to lead to paradigmatic change,
given, first, that it does not have any shadow of
hierarchy and second, its weak discursive ca-
pacities to date. However, the additive combi-
nation of the two approaches as such, does, ad-
mittedly, not tell as yet under which conditions
the OMC may lead to paradigmatic belief and
policy change. In other words, what are the
scope conditions of the constructivist explana-
tory model? The answer cannot be derived from
one of the two approaches but is to be found in
the characteristics of the policy-making envi-
ronment, in particular the extent of knowledge
uncertainty. In the field of economic and labour
market policies, knowledge uncertainty will re-
sult mainly from the failure of existing policies
in times of economic crisis and high unemploy-
ment, which makes it impossible for actors to
keep pursuing their existing preferences. Actor
interests and preferences are based on substan-
tial knowledge about the policy-relevant real-
ity, in particular about what the policy problems,
as well as the causal mechanisms and likely
outcomes of various policy options are. If ac-
tors become uncertain about this issues their
preferences are likely to become volatile, they
will not only look for new knowledge to re-gain
firm preferences but will also be more open to
discursive persuasion. Voluntary policy coordi-
nation through the OMC can supply both, the
exchange of knowledge and persuasion. In the
absence of strong policy failure and associated
knowledge uncertainty, actors are unlikely to
question their firmly held preferences. As a re-
sult, paradigmatic policy change will be impos-
sible and therefore the impact of the OMC will
be limited to gradual-instrumental adjustments.
To conclude, the complementary theoretical
approach developed in this article, points to the
limits for successful policy change through vol-
untary policy coordination. Will the intensively
discussed “new EU modes of governance” ac-
tually have an impact on national policy-mak-
ing? The article, clearly, has not given a defini-
tive answer to this question. Instead, it elabo-
rated the, rather demanding, conditions upon
which the capacity of the OMC for creating
paradigmatic policy change or policy innova-
tion eventually depends. It is still, however, too
early to determine whether the OMC actually
contributes to a more fundamental paradigm
shift, or whether its impact will be limited to
the more technocratic types of non-paradigmatic
policy adjustment.
ANMERKUNGEN
1 The author thanks Andreas Wimmel, Caroline de la
Porte, Patrick Scherhaufer and Wolfgang Wessels,
and the anonymous reviewer for helpful comments
on this paper and Dieter Pesendorfer for discussions
about the topic of this paper.
2 Other forms of soft law are social partner agreements
through the EU’s Social Dialogue (Falkner 1998)
and EU framework directives.
3 Weber’s distinction between Wertrationalität and
Zweckrationalität is useful to understand rational-
ism’s narrow interpretation of rationality (see also
Flyvbjerg 2001, Ch.5; Boudon 2003, 10ff.).
4 Udehn (2002) discusses methodological individu-
alism’s different faces in detail.
5 Adler (2002) gives a detailed presentation of
constructivism’s philosophical foundations and
presents also its different versions.
6 The sociological theory of exchange by Coleman
(1990) and the structuration theory by Giddens
(1984) have similar ambitions. See also Dowding’s
(1994) complementary use of Behaviouralism and
Institutionalism.
7 Schmidt’s approach differs from sociological
institutionalism (DiMaggio/Powell 1991), in that it
focuses on the discursive use of ideas by intentional
actors, rather than on institutionally entrenched
norms.
8 I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer for stress-
ing the importance of this aspect to me.
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9 I follow a combination strategy developed by Jupille
et al. (2003, 21f.)
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